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1. Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Pro-
fessor August Reinisch for his invitation to address such 
a distinguished audience in the prestigious University of 
Vienna Law School. I feel truly honoured to have been 
provided with the opportunity to maintain a dialogue and 
exchange ideas with such expert audience.
During a round table held here last year, I had the 
opportunity to mention to Professor August Reinisch my 
idea of presenting my preliminary findings on a method-
ology aiming at understanding how States attribute legal-
ity to a given use of force to an expert audience. Such 
presentation and exchange of ideas, by focusing on the 
application of such methodology to current incidents, 
would enable me to assert its validity, identify its limita-
tions, constraints, shortcomings and inconsistencies, and 
further review and refine it accordingly.
I’m also in debt to Peter Bachmayer, Christina Binder, 
Brigitte Weidinger and Scarlett Ortner, who very kindly 
assisted me to make this event possible. I want also to 
express my gratitude to Niels van Tol, Librarian at the 
Peace Palace Library in The Hague, who helped me with-
out dismay find books and copy articles on this subject, as 
well as to Evangelia Linaki, for developing the slides for 
this presentation and editing the final version of this text.
The views expressed herein are strictly personal and 
should not be considered as reflecting an official view of 
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any institution to which I may be affiliated with. Cases 
are analyzed just for academic purposes and, thus, such 
analysis should not be interpreted as an intention to pro-
mote any particular idea, opinion or judgment on politi-
cal or other issues of any country, entity or group of in-
dividuals.
As you constitute an expert audience on this subject 
and our time is quite limited, I will not describe or ex-
plain the content of legal or political categories, except 
when it may be absolutely needed. I will also not refer to 
the controversies that are well known in the works and 
teachings of qualified publicists, to which I will refer as 
“doctrine” throughout the presentation. As much as pos-
sible, I will use the terms in the most acceptable or wide-
spread interpretation.
2. Outline
·  Regularities	(that can be extracted from the analy-
sis of the practice of States on how they attribute 
legality to a use of force)
·  Paradigms	(historical evolution of attribution of legality)
·  2015	(current situation)
·  Next	20	years	(what we can expect)
·  Drivers	for	change	(that can affect the future paradigm)
3. Regularities
In a book published in Spanish in 2011, whose title may 
be translated as “Threats, Responses and Political Regime. 
Between Self-Defense and Preventive Intervention”1, I 
tried to explore, among others, four main issues that con-
stitute the first part of this presentation:
·  What is the process by which States make their at-
tribution of legality to a use of force?
1 Alberto E. Dojas, Amenazas, Respuestas y Régimen Político, 
Eudeba (2011).
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·  Are there some regularities or patterns that can ob-
served in the practice of States?
·  If yes, what could be the methodology to predict 
how States will attribute legality to a use of force?
·  What elements are taken into by States when they 
classify a use of force as legal or illegal?
The response to these questions can be found at the 
crossroads of different disciplines (eg. International Law; 
International Relations; Political Science; Diplomatic 
Studies; Sociology; Philosophy).
What is “practice of States” in this context?
Within the given context, “practice” not only refers to 
the technical expression in International Law, according 
to which State practice is an element used to prove the 
existence of customary law2, but also to a behavioural ap-
proach on how and why States affirm that a use of force 
is legal or illegal, which, in turn, affects their behaviour 
in the international arena and in international organiza-
tions.
4. A growing complexity of actors and 
circumstances
The analysis of the legality of a use of force has under-
gone a process of increasing complexity.
At the beginning of human society, although some 
moral and religious norms were established, there were 
no legal restrictions to the use of force between societies:
The first models that tried to establish whether a use 
of force was legal or illegal were constructed from the as-
sumption that a use of force ought to be defined in similar 
2 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.
X uses force
Legal
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terms as an offence under criminal law, and then attrib-
uted to a State. Thereafter, considering the circumstances 
of the case, the State’s international responsibility could 
be established, enabling, thus, to qualify the use of force 
as legal or illegal.
A further development occurred when the analysis 
started taking into account both actors in a given use of 
force: the one that used force and the other that suffered 
the attack. At a certain point, the actions and motivations 
of both parts were considered as circumstances affecting 
the legality of a use of force.
The model was refined again when the analysis of the 
circumstances lead to consider that, in fact, it was re-
quired to look at the legality of both the threat of one 
actor and the response of the other.
5. Usual legal categories of threats and 
responses
Looking at the scheme below we can understand that 
the legal categories that have been used historically to at-
tribute legality or illegality to a use of force are based on 
X uses force
circumstances
Legal Illegal
X
force
Y
circumstances
Legal
Illegal
X
force
Y
responsethreat
Legal
Illegal
Legal
Illegal
157
• O P I N I Ó N •
the opposition between self-defence and aggression, that 
is to say, to the threat and the response. As self-defense is 
an expression of an inherent right to survival, the analy-
sis is directed at the legality of the first use of force (the 
threat), which may trigger a subsequent reaction (the res-
ponse).
The United Nations (UN) Charter provisions on the 
use of force were drafted having in mind the experience 
of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the 
lack of observance of the basic assumption that threats 
and uses of force were prohibited. Most importantly, they 
were intended to reassure the main objective of avoid-
ing military confrontation between the great powers that 
emerged after World War II. Usual categories of use of 
force remained the basis on which the whole system of 
international security was built in San Francisco.
It was the maximum agreement that could be reached 
at that time. Unfortunately, some very important aspects 
were kept within the margins of a certain ambiguity:
a) The undefined terms of “armed attack” and 
“threat” that are crucial for the interpretation of 
the scope and limits of the legal regime on the use 
of force.
b) The two conflicting ideas contained in Article 51 of 
the UN Charter:
- On the one hand, that self-defense was only au-
thorized [if an armed attack occurs].
- On the other, that [Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense].
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- These two competing elements paved the way 
for the “strict” and “broad” interpretations of 
self-defense.
c) The lack of provisions on the so-called “precaution-
ary self-defense”3, and the legality of a response to 
a threat that may be carried out in the very near 
future, whose legality is based on the broad inter-
pretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
 Thus, although there was no doubt that when an 
armed attack had already been carried out it was 
legal to respond in self-defense if conditions like 
necessity and proportionality were met, the differ-
ent alternatives of precautionary self-defense could 
not reach a similar widespread acceptance.
d) The case of a preventive use of force intended to 
better respond to an armed conflict considered in-
evitable –although used quite often– was not con-
sidered.
e) On the other extreme of self-defense, aggression 
was clearly regarded as illegal, but the definition 
of its exact scope took quite some time to reach 
an extended agreement. The practice of States also 
broadened further the range of armed threats:
3 This term is used to avoid the ambiguity of the expression “pre-
emptive self-defense”.
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Aggression (Resolution 3314)
• Invasion, attack, military occupation or annexa-
tion by armed forces.
• Bombardment or use of weapons.
• Blockade of ports or coasts.
• Attack on land, sea or air forces and fleets.
• Use of armed forces within the territory of another 
State.
• To allow its territory to be used by another State 
for perpetrating an act of aggression.
• The sending of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, or its substantial involvement therein.
Other acts regarded as armed attack as per practice
• Attempt of an attack against a Head of State.
• Attack against vessels and aircraft.
• Attack against diplomatic premises.
• Attack against nationals abroad.
• Attacks committed by armed irregular groups and 
terrorists.
6. Timing of occurrence of the threat 
and the response - Legality as a function 
of time
The rationale behind Article 51 of the UN Charter is 
that time plays an important role in the legality of a use 
of force: as the occurrence of the threat fades over time, 
so does the legality of both the threat and the response. 
In other words, when the response is carried out vis-à- 
vis the occurrence of the threat affects the legality of the 
response. There is a correspondence between the legality 
of threats and responses as a function of the time of its 
occurrence.
Self-defense is legal when the threat is carried out. The 
legality of precautionary self-defense in its different vari-
ants (the classical model, the Webster formula and the 
doctrines of interception, anticipation and sequence of 
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events) is disputed as both the threat and the response 
are postponed to the future. Preventive interventions have 
been generally considered illegal. Aggression has always 
been considered illegal.
7. A panoply of responses is available
Responses to a threat:
a) May not involve the use of force, as international 
cooperation and soft intervention.
b) May be based on the consequences of a threat of 
using force in the future, like containment, deter-
rence and an ultimatum.
c) May cover the effective use of force, as in self-de-
fense both in its strict sense or precautionary vari-
ables, armed reprisals, actions authorized by the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII 
or based on a UNSC resolution but not expressly 
authorized by it, and armed interventions, includ-
ing those of a humanitarian purpose and preven-
tive nature.
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All these uses of force constitute a panoply of options 
for using force and other means to obtain a desired objec-
tive. They may be combined and used one at a time or in 
parallel. It is often the case that a response is declared to 
be used to achieve an objective but is intended, in real-
ity, to reach another. For example, armed interventions 
against terrorist bases may be intended to neutralize their 
activities and provoke a regime change at the same time.
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8. Political regimes
As the UN Charter was the result of negotiations be-
tween two opposing political systems, one of which was 
of a totalitarian nature, democracy could not be recog-
nized as an inherent right of individuals and societies. Ar-
ticle 2(7) of the UN Charter is said to have enshrined the 
so-called “westphalian paradigm”, prohibiting any inter-
vention in the political regime of a State.
However, the debate about political regimes was pre-
sent at the very beginning of the negotiation of the UN 
Charter: some States, like Argentina, were initially vetoed 
but finally admitted; others, like Spain, had to wait until 
1950 to be accepted as full members. In the course of the 
history of the UN, many political regimes were sanctioned 
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in one way or the other, like Maoism in China, Somozism 
in Nicaragua, Castrism in Cuba, racist regimes in Zimba-
bwe and South Africa, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
and the Assad regime in Syria. In addition, the protection 
of a political regime triggered many military interventions 
during the Cold War, like in Hungary (1956), the Domini-
can Republic (1965), Czechoslovakia (1968), Nicaragua 
(1982), Afghanistan (1979) or Grenada (1983).
The concept of a hostile regime as an essential part 
of a threat brought, as a natural consequence, the idea 
that the threat does not stem from the mere existence of 
arms (an idea to which Kant was very much attached to), 
but from the intentions of the political regime (a concept 
that was present in most of the doctrines of International 
Law during the classical period). For example, according 
to this theory, British or French nuclear weapons are not 
perceived as a threat by the US, because those countries 
have no intention to use them against the US. The same 
argument, but reversed, has been at the centre of the pres-
sure against Iran to negotiate a nuclear agreement, while 
Pakistan and India were accepted quite peacefully some 
time ago as nuclear powers4. Another argument of this 
doctrine is that democracies go to war as much as author-
itarian regimes, but almost never go to war against each 
other. The promotion of democracy appears as a condi-
tion for establishing peace worldwide.
The hostility of a regime is not only an essential part 
of the exercise of demonstrating the aggressive facets of 
threats and carried-out attacks, but also in the construc-
tion of an enemy. In the years following the Cold War, 
many expressions of a political nature have been used to 
this end, like ‘rogue’ and ‘outlaw’ States, ‘States of con-
cern’ or ‘a member of the axis of evil’. Hostile regimes 
may also provoke, with their actions, crimes against hu-
manity or massive violations of human rights. In many 
cases, these regimes were attributed a certain intrinsic 
4 It is not the aim of this presentation to focus on all the political 
considerations pertaining to these cases, rather to give an exam-
ple on how political regimes are considered as an element of the 
threat.
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irrationality in their decision-making process that made 
their actions unpredictable and, thus, not subject to de-
terrence and containment, which led to the use of force 
being justified as a response.
Hostility may also come from authoritarian and to-
talitarian regimes, in which a minority (a social group or 
an association of individuals) through undemocratic pro-
cedures seize the power of a State for its personal interest. 
In some cases, this interest may have a religious, ethnic, 
cultural or political motivation. In others, the group just 
isolates the country within the context of its international 
relations, in which case the State is usually referred to as 
a “pariah” State.
Authoritarian regimes, although they do not follow 
hostile policies, may also be seen as a threat as they may 
provoke, through their actions and propaganda, adverse 
sentiments in their population against certain countries 
and values, favoring extremism and terrorism. The au-
thoritarian nature of the regime may be used also as an 
argument to delimit a threat or a response.
A new political category that has appeared in recent 
times is that of “failed States”, to describe those that are 
incapable, for domestic reasons, to adequately control 
what is happening within their territories, paving the way 
for the establishment of hostile groups that may attack or 
threaten other States, or commit crimes against human-
ity and massive violations of human rights. This category 
is usually used to justify armed interventions within the 
territory of States, to attack terrorists and other armed 
groups, as failed States are incapable of preventing these 
crimes from being committed by groups operating within 
their territory.
In view of the above considerations, the nature of po-
litical regimes has been introduced in the evaluation of 
the nature and circumstances of threats and responses. 
Some States even maintain lists of hostile regimes, often 
on the grounds that such regimes protect or support ter-
rorist groups.
The presence of non-State actors, such as terrorists, 
in the territory of a State with hostile objectives against 
other States is also related to the political regime of the 
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State in question. The most common threats that have 
been identified in this regard are the following:
• Groups established undercover or secretly within a 
cooperative State.
• Groups established in failed States that cannot 
avoid their presence and actions.
• Groups established with the consent or support of 
a hostile regime.
• Groups that act under the direction and control of 
a hostile regime.
• Groups that try to obtain Weapons of Mass De-
struction (WMD) through illicit trade using illegal 
networks or other hostile regimes.
Some threats coming from political regimes may fall 
within the definition of aggression, enabling the use of 
force in self-defense as a legal response. However, other 
armed responses are in clear contradiction to the west-
phalian paradigm of the UN Charter and remain highly 
disputed if the response is not authorized by the UNSC. 
The most usual responses are:
• Interventions against terrorist bases in hostile re-
gimes and failed States.
• Interventions against hostile regimes to neutralize 
their action.
• Interventions against hostile regimes to avoid their 
consolidation in power.
• Interventions against hostile regimes to provoke a 
regime change.
• Interventions in authoritarian regimes to install a 
democratic government.
• Interventions in authoritarian regimes to restore a 
democratic government.
• Interventions in failed States to provoke a regime 
change.
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9. New threats and responses
The end of the Cold War created the conditions for the 
emergence of some trends that triggered a political and 
legal debate about a new set of legal categories for these 
“new” threats and responses:
a) An increasing recognition of the rights of individu-
als and societies (eg. democracy and open societies; 
human rights and civil society; reactions to crimes 
against humanity like ethnic, cultural cleansing) 
that forced States to act in their protection.
b)  Proliferation of access to WMD and their related 
technologies.
c)  Illicit networks at a global scale, trafficking with il-
legal trade, including WMD and their related tech-
nologies.
d)  Armed groups both at the national and interna-
tional level committing terrorist acts.
These threats were tied, in many cases, to political re-
gimes that were either not able to counter their occur-
rence, or would create the conditions for their emergence, 
support and even direct such threats.
The responses to these new threats not only triggered 
the development of new means to respond to them, but 
also provoked the adaptation and transformation of ex-
isting institutions. For example:
a) More active role of the UNSC in authorizing the 
use of force to restore and even to install democ-
racy in failed States.
b)  New doctrines, such as Humanitarian Intervention 
and Responsibility to Protect.
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c)  Establishment of the International Criminal Court.
d)  “Legislative” role of the UNSC, forcing the adop-
tion of internal legislation and enforcement institu-
tions to prevent and combat illicit networks related 
to WMD proliferation and terrorism.
e)  UNSC authorization to States for more intrusive 
ways to control and enforce UNSC resolutions on 
areas beyond their jurisdiction in situations where 
almost no force is used, along the lines of the PSI 
directives.
f)  Increasing preventive interventions against the ac-
quisition and illicit trade of WMD and their tech-
nologies and terrorist groups within a State.
g)  Consent to the use of force by foreign powers 
against armed groups and terrorists controlling ter-
ritory in one or more States.
10. The circumstances of the case - 
Investigation of facts and objective 
assessment
In a very broad sense, the term “circumstances” refer 
to all the requisites, constraints, conditions and facts that 
should be considered for the attribution of legality to a 
use of force.
There is general agreement that a use of force should 
comply with the requisites of necessity, proportionality 
and immediacy. The rules of International Humanitarian 
Law should also be respected during hostilities, as well 
as the reporting clause contained in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.
Usually, States that use force invoke their own sources 
of information as an objective description of facts and the 
hostile intentions of the other part. However, the evalua-
tion of the fulfilment of these requirements in a given use 
of force demands a careful and unbiased analysis. The 
practice of States shows this process can be hotly disput-
ed.
A way out from conflicting views on the evaluation 
of circumstances is the appointment of an investigation 
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body to conduct an impartial assessment of facts. This 
can be done through different means, like the investiga-
tive mechanisms established by the UN Secretary-General, 
the request of investigation by a UN Agency or regional 
organization, the appointment of a team of impartial ex-
perts, and, eventually, the referral of the case to the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) or any other international 
judicial body.
When analyzing the synergies of the threat-response 
process, establishing the lawfulness of the conduct is not 
only characterized by certain complexity, but is also usu-
ally shrouded in similar amount of uncertainty or contro-
versy. When X’s army occupies Y’s territory and Y repels 
the invasion once X’s forces have crossed its border, Inter-
national Law establishes the illegality of X’s conduct and 
the legality of Y’s conduct, even when a variety of circum-
stances might affect that classification. But as we move 
away from those cases that are clearly identifiable, in a 
situation when Y claims that X is preparing, or intends to 
invade or attack Y at some point, there is greater contro-
versy on the applicable rules or their interpretation, espe-
cially when one considers the immense destructive power 
of the first use of modern weapons.
One State may attribute to another the intention of 
threatening it, allowing it to justify the response as self-
defense, by virtue of its inherent right to decide whether 
a threat exists. The hostility of a political regime is often 
seen as proof of the existence of a threat. Establishing the 
facts, when dealing with intentions, is particularly diffi-
cult, because International Law has at present no specific 
rules for attributing responsibility in cases where actors 
perceive mere intentions as threats. Each State retains the 
right to respond to a threat to ensure that its interests are 
safeguarded, and no legal system can oblige it to commit 
suicide by observing the law.
Assessment of the threat depends on the information 
available at the point when self-defense must be exer-
cised. If the right to self-defense is not questioned when 
the reaction is launched, the legality of exercising will be 
established.
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The critical date is the moment when the self-defense 
is exercised, although subsequent pieces of evidence may 
strengthen or weaken the legality and legitimacy of the 
action. In the case of Iraq’s possession of weapons of 
mass destruction during the 2003 crisis, the legality of 
the action was determined by the veracity and accuracy 
of the information available up to the point when the in-
tervention was launched, which was questioned by some 
members of the UNSC. Consequently, the legitimacy was 
affected because, as was subsequently proven, no such 
weapons existed. Israel’s destruction of the Osirak nu-
clear reactor, seen as a preventive intervention, gained 
greater legitimacy when Baghdad’s secret nuclear plans 
were discovered after the Gulf War.
11. Legality: different shades of grey
When analyzing the attribution of legality to a use of 
force as per the practice of States, it is observed that, in 
many cases, the process of deciding the legality or illegal-
ity of a use of force is usually not based on clear con-
sensus. There is much room for disagreement, not only 
because of the ambiguity in the interpretations of the 
applicable law, but also because of the manipulation of 
political and legal arguments by States and the existence 
of interests which, in any given situation, condition the 
actors’ positions.
This process is complex, far from being objective, dis-
passionate or purely ‘rational’5. A number of historical, 
institutional, cultural, ideological, religious and psycho-
logical factors also exert considerable influence on the 
evaluation of the threat and how reasonable, or propor-
tionate, the response is.
To reflect as closely as possible the reality of the ways 
in which the community of States attributes legality to 
an event involving force, three other categories need to 
be added to those of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, because a use of 
5 This term is used here in a general sense, as an analysis that es-
tablishes, with relative certainty or approximation, the costs to 
benefits ratio of a given decision.
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force is often considered to be legal or illegal only by a 
majority of States, and, in some cases, opinions as to such 
legality are clearly split among various groups. With all 
this in mind, the following five categories of legality can 
be identified:
12. Case analysis
The attribution of legality has evolved from the classi-
cal period of International Law up to modern times. We 
have segmented time in periods between critical events in 
the evolution of International Law. This comparative ap-
proach with ease our dialogue about their probable evo-
lution in the coming two decades.
When considering the legality	of	the	usual	categories	
of	 threats	 and	 responses6, it is observed that the cur-
rent attribution of legality follows a pattern, according 
to which the more remote the occurrence of the threat, 
the more the illegality increases. It is also noted that im-
minent formulas and doctrines are listed in the chrono-
logical order of their formulation, which explains that 
the classic-period formula, elaborated when the caveats 
of the UN Charter were not present, appears first in the 
section, while, according to its nature, should come at the 
end of that section if only considered by its requirements, 
which are less stringent than the UN Charter.
As in a mirror, the legality of both the threat and the 
response is a function of the time of occurrence of the 
6 See Chart on page 5.
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threat, as it is visible in the below Charts on Threats,	Re-
sponses and Time.
In order to see how this proposed methodology works 
in practice, twelve very well-known cases from various 
periods after the adoption of the UN Charter, where 
threats and responses were of a different nature, have 
been selected and reflected in a Chart7. One should bear 
7 This Chart concerning the attribution of legality to a use of 
force in selected cases can be downloaded at www.aedojas.com.
ar. In this presentation, due to lack of time and space, a short 
overview and general reflections are provided upon the selected 
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in mind that the information presented therein is given 
from the point of view of the responding State, that is, 
how the State that is conducting the response explains the 
nature of the threat and the response.
The first thing that can be seen is that the alleged na-
ture of the threat follows the usual categories that have 
been considered. Responses are usually defined by the 
user also in terms of the usual categories, but in fact they 
may not correspond exactly to the different alternatives 
chosen to respond from the available panoply.
When the armed attack was clearly carried out by the 
armed forces of a State (that corresponds to the strict in-
terpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter), self-defense 
was alleged as the response and there was no controversy 
about its legality. This can be seen in Iraq (Kuwait) (1990). 
However, when the alleged carried-out armed attack con-
sisted of an attack against nationals abroad (that we have 
seen as “other acts in the practice of States constituting an 
“armed attack”), the armed intervention used as response 
was considered generally illegal. This was the case in En-
tebbe (1976). The legality of the response to carried-out 
attacks was also considered generally illegal when coming 
from armed groups not forming part of the armed forces 
of the State (Litani Operation (1978); Nicaragua (Sandin-
ism) (1982); Israel in Gaza (2008)) or when it constituted 
crimes against humanity against its own population when 
the response constituted humanitarian intervention, as 
was the case in Kosovo (1999). The response to a terror-
ist attack already carried out and addressed by a UNSC 
resolution, although some States expressed doubts about 
its legality, was generally considered legal, as was the case 
in Afghanistan (2001).
When the threat was related to an imminent or possi-
ble attack, the different variants under this category were 
used to explain the necessity to respond. In some cases, 
the threats were clearly expressed as coming from the po-
litical regime (eg. Hungary (1956), Afghanistan (USSR) 
(1979), Nicaragua (Sandinism) (1982) and Iraq (2003)), 
and when there was a concurrence to consider them as 
twelve cases. However, in the coming months, a detailed analy-
sis of 53 cases will become available at www.aedojas.com.ar.
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generally illegal, the opposition to that attribution came 
from the superpower itself and its allies. In others, like 
in the Six Days War (1967), the proximity of anticipa-
tion to a carried-out attack was generally considered as 
legal. When the use of force was an armed intervention 
against groups posing an imminent threat of repeated at-
tacks (doctrine of “the sequence of events”), the response 
was considered almost illegal, (eg. Israel in Gaza (2008)).
When the occurrence of the threat was even more re-
mote and fell under the category of preventive interven-
tion, like in the cases of Iraq (Osirak) (1981) and Nicara-
gua (Sandinistas) (1982) which was related to US interests 
in the region, it was clearly considered as illegal. In the 
case of the armed intervention against Iraq (2003), where 
other elements were also present (eg. regime change, il-
legal possession of WMD, a unilateral enforcement of a 
UNSC resolution) the response was, nevertheless, consid-
ered as generally illegal.
It is visible from the Chart8 that there is always an 
aspect of the response that is directed to counter the 
threat coming from the political regime. The most usual 
responses are shown there.
An objective investigation of facts was only proposed 
in four of the twelve cases, following a normal ratio in 
cases of use of force. In Hungary (1956), UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) resolution 1132 created, in 1957, a 
Commission to report on the armed intervention of the 
USSR; the case of Nicaragua (Sandinistas) (1982) was re-
ferred to the ICJ, but the US refused its jurisdiction; in 
Kosovo (1999), a Verification Mission was established 
under the auspices of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); in Iraq (2003), the 
UNSC established UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), 
that condemned Iraq’s lack of cooperation.
Next to this section of the Chart, some additional fea-
tures can be found, such as the multilateral response to 
the use of force, the voting at the UNSC and UNGA and, 
if the case involved the Americas, how voting resulted at 
8 This Chart concerning the attribution of legality to a use of force 
in selected cases can be downloaded at www.aedojas.com.ar.
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the OAS. On the basis of the voting results, the last col-
umn states the legality attributed to the use of force.
Sources to determine an attribution of legality to a 
use of force
The sources to make this determination are, on the 
one hand, decisions taken within the UNSC and, eventu-
ally other bodies of the UN, like the UNGA. In certain 
cases, other international organizations may adopt deci-
sions related to the legality of a use of force, particularly 
those that have a regional nature and, due to such char-
acter, may play a role in certain cases, as was the case of 
the OAS during the Soviet Missiles in Cuba (1962). Other 
international organizations may discuss the legality of a 
use of force under certain circumstances (eg. NATO dur-
ing the Kosovo (1991) crisis).
In addition to those organizations where the legality 
of a decision to use force is submitted to a formal deci-
sion, other instruments play a valuable auxiliary role in 
this determination. Such instruments are, for example:
• Discussions on the subject within international or-
ganizations. In this respect, the transcripts of inter-
ventions during UNSC meetings (S/PV documents) 
are of particular importance. Official documents 
submitted for the consideration of such Organiza-
tions, such as Notes from Governments, are also 
important.
• Public statements by Heads of State and Govern-
ment, Ambassadors and other authorized Members 
of Cabinets, particularly Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs and Defense.
• Other public statements by officials, like the Legal 
Advisers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Debates and Decisions of National Parliaments and 
Hearings at Congress Commissions, such as those 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
• Official documents intended to announce policies 
and strategies related to the use of force, like De-
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fense White Papers, International Security Strate-
gies and other similar documents.
• As a subsidiary source, the analysis of expert publi-
cists.
13. Paradigms
The information contained in the table of cases can 
allow us to construct paradigms of legality, sorting it ac-
cording to different variables. If we look at the Chart 
Evolution	of	 the legality	of	armed	responses	by	 type	of	
threat, it is evident that:
• A response to an armed attack in the strict sense 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter has always been 
considered legal;
• A response to an imminent attack, while consid-
ered legal because there were almost no legal re-
strictions to the use of force during the Classic 
Period, had some limitations in certain treaties in 
force during the inter-war period between the two 
World Wars, and was disputed after the adoption 
of the UN Charter, depending on the strict or broad 
interpretation of Article 51. After the 9/11 attack, 
its legality started to broaden and, apparently, will 
continue to be in the next 20 years, as shown, for 
example, in counter terrorism armed interventions.
• Responses to eventual or possible attacks that cor-
respond to the doctrine of preventive intervention, 
enjoyed the same lack of restrictions during the 
Classic Period, but were considered generally illegal 
during the inter-war period between the two World 
Wars, according to the provisions of the League of 
Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and other trea-
ties. After the 9/11 attack, some preventive inter-
ventions began to be considered generally legal, but 
their illegality may be restored in the future or, at 
least, considered generally illegal.
• The response to attacks to nationals abroad was 
disputed after World War I (WWI) and the entry 
into force of the UN Charter, but it became more 
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difficult to be accepted under the logic of spheres of 
influence of the Cold War. At the end of it, the origi-
nal, yet disputed, attribution was restored, but after 
9/11 and the emergence of terrorism, it has become 
broadly accepted. Some restrictions, however, may 
appear in the near future, as a multipolar world 
may not accept its legality so easily.
• The attacks against the political order or regime 
of a State, while quite natural during the classic 
period when kingdoms usually fought each other 
to seize control of power, like in royal succession 
wars, were restricted between both World Wars, 
and considered mainly illegal after the westphalian 
paradigm was established by the UN Charter. After 
the 9/11 attack, armed responses to attacks against 
the political system (particularly those conducted 
by terrorist groups) started to be considered legal, 
in some cases under the umbrella of a UNSC reso-
lution. With certain limitations according to the 
circumstances of the case, they may continue to be 
considered generally legal in the years to come.
• The use of force against crimes against humanity 
committed by States was considered legal during 
the Classic period, but such attribution suffered 
partially because of the League of Nations proce-
dures for solving disputes and other treaties limit-
ing the use of force. It was, however, considered 
illegal after the UN Charter entered into force and 
throughout the Cold War for the reasons already 
mentioned earlier. The right to intervene to help 
populations in despair started to be voiced after 
the end of the Cold War, allowing more intrusive 
measures within States; however, the paradigmatic 
Kosovo (1999) case, was considered generally il-
legal. The situation changed dramatically after 
9/11, when there is an increasing appearance of 
doctrines, like the Responsibility to Protect that 
consider humanitarian interventions legal. They 
may continue to be considered generally legal in 
the years to come.
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• The response to a violation of human and other es-
sential rights followed a similar pattern, although 
some restrictions were voiced during the Classic 
Period of International Law, when individual and 
collective rights were not so clearly recognized. 
While such responses were considered illegal under 
the westphalian paradigm of the UN Charter, they 
started to be slowly recognized after the end of the 
Cold War, and even more after 9/11, and may con-
tinue to be in the future.
• The use of force against threats coming from hos-
tile regimes and failed States, although not suffer-
ing from any restrictions during the Classic Period, 
was affected by the existing restrictions of the in-
ter-war period between the two World Wars. Under 
the UN Charter, such use was considered illegal, 
except when the threat would take the form of an 
armed attack by regular armed forces. The situa-
tion remained the same during the Cold War and 
its aftermath with few exceptions, but it changed 
dramatically after 9/11, when regimes started to be 
perceived as the main problem in the fight against 
terrorist and other armed groups. Some restrictions 
to these armed interventions may appear in the 
future, as no complete agreement may occur in a 
multipolar world system.
• International criminal networks follow the same 
pattern, except that they were considered illegal 
also during the Cold War and Post-Cold War peri-
ods, when the armed intrusion within a State was 
still considered as being against the westphalian 
paradigm of the UN Charter and almost impossible 
with the world divided in two opposing blocks.
• The same approach was valid with respect to inter-
national terrorist groups, although some interven-
tions were considered legal during the Cold War 
and the period thereafter.
• Finally, the threat from WMD, while non-existent 
during the Classic Period, became a source of con-
cern after the industrial revolution, when the Ge-
neva Protocols and other similar instruments were 
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adopted. However, the legality of the response to 
this threat became disputed after the adoption of 
the UN Charter and during the dynamics of the 
Cold War. Although such threats were considered 
generally illegal after the Cold War, there was a 
drastic change and started being considered as le-
gal after 9/11, when the fear appeared that they 
may fall in the hands of terrorist groups and hostile 
regimes. Therefore, responses to threats from such 
groups and regimes started to be considered as le-
gal. With some limitations, the may continue to be 
generally legal for the same reasons.
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14. What are the drivers for a change in 
the future legality of a use of force?
The exact evolution of events and circumstances in the 
next 20 years, during which reasonable predictions can be 
made, constitutes a quite complex and risky exercise, as 
unexpected situations may arise that can radically trans-
form the international environment. But, while accepting 
these caveats, we should try to understand what can be 
expected in terms of attribution of legality within this 
time frame. As we have seen, since WWI some adapta-
tions and changes have occurred every 20 years, but para-
digms have not been drastically affected. In fact, what can 
be perceived is a continuous process of adaptation to new 
circumstances and realities.
Having these assumptions as a starting point, we may 
look for the drivers for change or, in other way, for those 
realities and circumstances that may affect how States 
will attribute legality to a use of force in the next 20 years. 
These drivers for change, drawn from legal and political 
readings, can be the following:
1. The impact of technological change on warfare 
and intervention in the territory of other countries:
• What was considered the “territory” of a State, with 
a cubic spatial approach, is not valid anymore, as 
territory has evolved to a multidimensional area of 
interest and projection of power that goes well be-
yond the spatial limits of the State established, for 
example, in the Convention of the Law of the Sea.
• What are still called by some authors “unmanned” 
technologies, that in fact are “manned” but in a dif-
ferent way, like drones and robots.
• The development of cyberwar capabilities that may 
have a paralyzing effect on the opponent.
• Other innovations in arms systems and technolo-
gies that may produce a collapse of great magni-
tude within States.
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2. Multipolar international system:
• If the world is going towards a multicentered or 
multipolar world system, experience has shown 
that such system tends to be more unstable than 
hegemonies, and may increase the level of confron-
tation and use of threat as an instrument of foreign 
policy. Deterrence and containment, rather than 
negotiation, may become more prominent as the 
internal logic of the system. Focal armed interven-
tions may also be added as a valid instrument to 
achieve critical national or regional objectives.
• What level of hostility can we, then, expect from 
political regimes?
• Will the fight over territory and areas of influ-
ence continue along the period, as we have seen in 
Ukraine, Crimea, the Middle East and the South 
Sea of China?
3. Cultural and religious dividing lines:
• After the Cold War, there was a quite brief period 
of global optimism in the hope of building up a 
global society based on common values. However, 
it soon appeared that national, cultural, ethnic and 
religious dividing lines, once under the control of 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, started to 
emerge with the collapse of these regimes, with the 
danger of genocide and crimes against humanity 
being perpetrated.
• The broadened scope of human rights also went 
under an increasing attack in certain areas. In some 
cases, they are just considered an expression of 
Western values, not applicable worldwide.
• Are these trends going to divide the world along 
these lines, or are we moving, towards a global so-
ciety with shared values? What are, then, going to 
be the responses to threats and attacks relating to 
situations involving the respect or violation of hu-
man rights?
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4. Subsistence of authoritarian regimes:
• The same approach is valid with respect to democ-
racy and open societies: while democracy was con-
sidered to be of paramount importance and proof 
of progress of Humanity, it is now subject to criti-
cism in different areas as reflecting Western values 
and interests.
• If democracies are the only regimes that tend to 
solve their differences peacefully through negotia-
tion instead of using force, what would the impact 
of the subsistence of authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes be?
5. Global economy without global values – An 
increasing number of failed States and non-State 
actors?
• Is the combination of the two previous trends (cul-
tural and religious dividing lines and authoritarian 
/ totalitarian regimes) compatible with a unified 
global economy regulated mainly by market forces, 
or may we assist to situations were force is used to 
attain economic objectives, like, for example, con-
trol of scarce natural resources?
• Another combination of circumstances may bring 
instability to the global system: the action of non-
State actors, particularly illegal groups with strong 
armed capabilities to control parts of the territory 
of failed States, fighting for control over strategic 
resources and earning substantial amounts of mon-
ey from illicit trade. At a certain point of develop-
ment, they can control extensive areas where they 
impose their own laws, and provoke the final col-
lapse of the national State.
• The transformation of terrorist groups into a mili-
tary force that control quite extended areas of terri-
tory, in some cases present on the territory of mul-
tiple States.
• Will armed intervention continue to be an option 
as we can actually see it in the UK, France, Iran 
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and Russia interventions in Syria, or Saudi Arabia 
in Yemen?
6. WMD and technologies related thereto:
• The proliferation of WMD and the illegal acqui-
sition of related technologies may remain an im-
portant element of controversy that may encourage 
containment, deterrence and armed interventions.
• In some cases, terrorist groups and illicit networks 
may resort to the use of chemical weapons, as has 
already been the case in Syria and Iraq.
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